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The objective is to explain the behavior of the tobacco industry over an 18-year period. Ultimately, we hope to use the model to perform policy simulation experiments to evaluate the effects of alternative governmental and managerial policies on the behavior of the industry.
We begin with a brief description of the industry. Next we discuss the theoretical specification of the model and the statistically estimated equations. We conclude with some example simulation results which provide additional evidence of the validity of the model for explaining the behavior of the tobacco industry over the period 1949 through 1966.
Description of the Industry
The tobacco industry, as we will use the term in this paper, includes the growers of flue-cured tobacco leaf, the auction-warehouse system wherein the leaf is sold to the cigarette manufacturers, and the manufacture and sale of cigarettes to the public. We ignore the manufacture of other tobacco products.
There are a number of other types of tobacco leaf, e.g., Burley, Maryland, fire-cured, etc., which we have elected to ignore.' Our justification is that flue-cured leaf is the most important in cigarette production. One estimate has placed the average blend of all domestic cigarettes as 49 per cent flue-cured and 37 per cent Burley [26, The selling side of the leaf market consists of a very large number of growers.2 However, the buying side is quite different. Tobacco buyers are either representatives of the domestic cigarette manufacturers or are buyers for export. Table 2 is included to give an indication of the concentration of the cigarette manufacturing industry. The buying side of the leaf market can reasonably be classified as oligopsonistic. A number of studies have been made in an effort to determine the extent to which the buying side behaves competitively [16, 20, 25] . The results are inconclusive, although one hypothesis which has been put forth is that of "percentage buying" [16] . This hypothesis states that the buyers are more concerned with insuring that other buyers pay the same price for leaf inputs than they are in obtaining the minimum (oligopsonistic) price. Given this behavioral pattern, it becomes more acceptable to estimate a demand function for tobacco. The model consists of 19 equations which represent the tobacco industry over the period 1949-1966. Since the model is recursive, the seven behavioral equations (1, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, and 16) were estimated by ordinary least squares. 4 The remaining twelve equations are identities. It is convenient to consider the model in three blocks. The first block of six equations explains total leaf production and the effect of the government restriction on output. The second block, equations 7-13, describes the determination of leaf price and the effect of the government support price. The third block, equations 14-19, is concerned with the cigarette manufacturing portion of the industry.
To illustrate the order in which the blocks must be solved and to provide an initial overview of the model, we have included a flow chart (figure 1). As indicated in the chart, blocks A and C must be solved first for the values of Q and DDISP, and then block B may be solved for the remaining variables.5 Bars are nlaced over nredetermined variables.
A Leaf Production
The justification for treating leaf production separately from price determination is that the tobacco leaf market is of the cobweb type. That is, price and production are not determined simultaneously. Rather, production depends upon lagged price and can be determined first. Since price depends upon current production, it can logically be determined after production has been fixed. In more concrete terms, tobacco growers decide on leaf production in the Spring based upon the price received for the crop in the preceding Fall. The tobacco is then harvested in July and August and taken to market. Since the growers normally have no storage capability, the leaf production is thrown upon the market in perfectly inelastic supply (modified somewhat by the control program).
We have found it useful to treat the average amount of leaf produced per acre, YPA, as exogenous to the model. That is, YPA depends largely upon weather, technical change and, since 1965, YPA has been subject to govern- To avoid this difficulty we have employed a strategy proposed by Johnson [12] in a study of the Burley market. Rather than attempting to estimate A, we estimate the difference between A and acreage allotment AL. This difference or underage, UND, is the number of acres not planted even though permitted by the allotment. The hypothesis is that UND will be lower the greater the economic incentive is to growers. Although Johnson used the lagged price of leaf as the economic incentive variable, we have used a different approach. Before describing this approach we might point out that the use of lagged price appears to have the defect that AL is not accounted for. That is, UND might be zero in year 1 and 500 in year 2 even though the lagged price was constant, simply because the level of AL varied.
Our strategy is to estimate a hypothetical free market acreage, AFR, and to use the excess of AFR over AL as a measure of the growers' incentive to reduce UND. The AFR equation was estimated by using 1910-1930 data. Thus, since the government control program did not go into effect until after 1933, the 1910-1930 data points should all lie on the line OB in figure 1 . Of course, in using the equation we must make the rather strong assumption that the structure of supply has not changed over this long period of time. The excellent statistical results for these equations offer some support for this assumption. The statement that T depends upon PACT requires further explanation. As suggested by Johnson [12] , we hypothesize that T depends upon the difference between SP and the hypothetical free market price, PFR. Thus, PFR is analogous to AFR since it represents what the price would have been if the government control program had not been in effect. Since we used the parameter estimates from the PACT equation to generate the artificial PFR series (to be described below), it is in this special sense that we view T and PACT as simultaneously determined. While we would have preferred a simultaneous estimation of the T and PACT equations, this was not possible because of the nonexistence of actual data on PFR.
We now turn to equation 10, the PACT equation, in order to explain the derivation of the free market price, PFR. First, however, we need to explain the explanatory variables used.
A number of studies of the tobacco industry [8, 15, 20, 25] have all found that an important variable in explaining price is a variable re-sembling our SQNET. This variable is the ratio of the total supply of leaf available to total usage of leaf, or disappearance. As such, SQNET represents an inventory stock to sales ratio concept. Cigarette manufacturers have often stated that they seek to maintain a ratio of total supply of leaf to current usage of about 2.5 to 1 [20] . A main reason for such large inventories is the 2-3 year aging requirement of tobacco leaf. The numerator of the variable SQNET is equal to the sum of the stock of tobacco on hand at the beginning of the market period and leaf production minus exports and minus tobacco pledged under the support program, T. The numerator is then divided by the current domestic usage of tobacco leaf, DDISP. The expectation that the coefficient of this variable in the PACT equation should be negative is confirmed by the statistical results.
The second variable, PCAPY, is an income variable which accounts for shifts in demand over the period. It has a positive coefficient as expected. Perhaps the most serious omission is a variable to account for the quality of leaf. Unfortunately, we have been unable to obtain such a variable.
The derivation of PFR from equation 10 is accomplished by setting T equal to zero. That is, if the government is not intervening in the market, total pledges of leaf will be zero. Hence, equation 11 is simply equation 10 with T set equal to zero. PFR is always less than PACT, as expected.
Equation 13 is the T equation. The goodnessof-fit of this equation, as measured by the coefficient of determination, is poorer than for any of the other equations. However, the regression coefficient is of the expected sign and is statistically significant. We should also mention that in estimating the equation a value of PFR was used which differs slightly from the PFR given in equation 11. The "adjusted" PFR used was determined by first calculating a predicted difference between PACT and PFR for each year by subtracting equation 11 from equation 10. Then, the predicted difference was subtracted from the observed market price to obtain "adjusted" PER. 
